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THEOLOGY AND THE NECESSITY OF NATURES
W. S. Anglin

In this paper we give a definition of a 'nature' which (1) captures the idea
that a nature is a kind of constant in the midst of change; (2) does not sanction
the inference of the conclusion 'Christ has to be human' from the premiss
'Christ has human nature'; (3) enables us to defend the logical coherence of
certain theological claims; and (4) accords with many of our pre-analytic
intuitions about 'natures.'

Each of the following theological claims involves the concept of a 'nature.'
1. It is possible for something to have two natures: human and divine.
2. The Word has the divine nature essentially but human nature accidentally.
3. It is not possible for a non-divine human to acquire the divine nature.
4. Non-divine humans who become Christians are given the higher nature
of the 'spiritual man. 'I

In this paper I offer an analysis of a 'nature' and I use this analysis to defend
the above claims against the charge of logical incoherence.
I

A nature is a property or set of properties which is very important for the
individual whose nature it is. Indeed, one might easily think that a nature is
an essential property in the sense that the proposition
s has nature H

implies the proposition
Necessarily, Hs.

If this were true, the fact that the Word of God assumed human nature would
imply that he is human in every possible world. 2 However, there are possible
worlds in which there are no human beings, possible worlds in which there
is no need for an incarnation, and possible worlds in which, although there
is a need for an incarnation, God simply chooses to express his compassion
in some other way.
Quite apart from theological concerns, there are good reasons for rejecting
the idea that a nature is an essential property. In this section we consider two
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such reasons. In the next section we offer a positive account of what it is to
be a 'nature.'
One reason for rejecting the idea that a nature is an essential property is
that we often use the word 'nature' to refer to a psychological orientation
which, although it is an enduring and important part of a person, is not
essential to his being. We might agree that someone is an introvert 'by nature'
but we would not hold a funeral if he became an extravert. Aristotle reminds
us that it is 'easier to change a habit than to change one's nature' but he
nonetheless envisages the possibility of changing one's nature. 3
A second reason for rejecting the idea that a nature is an essential property
is that the universe is not as neat as our conceptual system. The nature of a
thing has to do with what it is like in nature. However, whereas a system of
essential properties is perfectly regular and static, nature is not.
Consider the following: a) crows are easy to distinguish from their background environment; b) crows do not change a great deal during their adult
life; c) crows give birth only to crows. If these three statements were false,
I doubt we would even have a concept of 'crow.' That there are crows and
that it makes sense to talk about their nature is bound up with the fact that,
at least in one possible world, nature works in a regular and recurring manner
to produce the mobile objects which are crows. However, nature need not
(and does not) work in a perfectly regular and recurring manner to do this.
The fact that crows have a certain nature is not undermined by some infrequent exceptions to nature's uniformity. For example, even if, due to a mutation, a crow occasionally begets something that is not crow-like, we can
stiI1 talk about 'normal' crows and their nature.
A nature is something which characterises or determines how the thing whose
nature it is normally works, grows and so on but it is not essential to that thing.
Suppose we have a robin calIed Jennifer. Suppose that, perhaps thanks to some
quantum mechanical freak, Jennifer gradually turns into a crow and then back
into a robin. In her final robin stage she remembers many things she learnt in
both her previous stages. The change here is drastic but not so drastic as to
force us to conclude that Jennifer has ceased to exist. Such a bird is highly
unlikely but not even nomologically impossible. Moreover, she has for a
while the nature of a crow without being a crow necessarily.
As another counterexample to the thesis that if something has a nature then
it is necessary that it have that nature, consider the possibility of a rosebush
which loses its thorns and begins to grow tomatoes-while still bearing roses.
The resulting hybrid is such that it qualifies both as a rosebush and as a tomato
plant. It might have remained as a mere rosebush but it is now also a tomato
plant. Thus it has the nature of a tomato plant without being a tomato plant
essentially.
One might object to this example that, at the molecular level, my hybrid
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rosebush-tomato plant is really neither. How can it have the genetic information of a tomato plant if it is growing roses? How can it have the genetic
information of a rosebush if it lacks thorns?
My reply to this objection is that I am not committed to a program of
explicating 'natures' in terms of scientific 'essences.' I do not deny that such
a program would be worthwhile but, at least in this paper, I am engaged not
in a botany project but in a logical analysis of ordinary language concepts.
On this level, the word 'rosebush' applies to plants which, say, bear roses. It
is in this sense that I claim that it is logically possible that something be both
a rosebush and a tomato plant.
Let me try to make my position clearer in terms of an example from George
Seddon's article "Logical Possibility. "4 Seddon dislikes the idea that it is
logically possible that an iron bar float in water. What he means is that iron
and water, having by definition certain atomic structures, have certain specific gravities, and that of iron is greater than that of water. Given the 'nature'
of iron and water at the atomic level, it is a logical consequence that iron
does not float in water.
I do not take this approach to 'logical possibility.' I take something to be
logically possible if it is broadly logically possible in the sense given in
Plantinga's book The Nature of Necessity. On this view it is logically possible
for a bar of iron to float on water. For the protons in the iron might possibly
have a lower mass than the protons in water. Or the contact of iron and water
might possibly produce, via a fifth fundamental force, a kind of magnetic
field which would all but raise the iron on its own, leaving, however, a little
work for the buoyant force of the water to do, so that we can really say that
the iron is 'floating.' Seddon is presupposing that the basic structure of matter
as we know it is a fixed given. But it is broadly logically possible that, say,
not all protons have the same mass. Conceived in my fashion, rather than in
a way that is tied to the actual physics of the world, logical possibilities cover
a wide territory. In particular, it is logically possible that a plant be a rosebush
and also a tomato plant. This hybrid might have a chemistry very different
from any that could be found in this universe but it would still fall under our
ordinary language concepts of 'rosebush' and 'tomato plant.' Regardless of
how a botanist would classify it, it would instantiate properties like 'having
jagged leaves,' 'bearing roses on thin stems' and so on, and thus on an
ordinary dictionary definition of 'rosebush,' it would count as a rosebush.
Similarly, it would count as a tomato plant.
Note, moreover, that I am not saying that this plant has some hybrid nature-as if the two one-place predicates 'being a rosebush' and 'being a
tomato plant' could somehow mix together in a Platonic heaven. My plant is
a hybrid not because it instantiates some hybrid nature but because it instantiates two distinct natures. When I say that a book is both blue and heavy, I
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do not mean to imply that it possesses some confused property of blue-heaviness. I mean simply that it is blue, and also heavy. Similarly, when I say that
a plant is both a rosebush and a tomato plant, I mean only that it is a rosebush,
and also a tomato plant. This point is important for what follows because I
shall compare Christ to this rosebush-tomato plant, and I do not want the
reader to think that my comparison implies that he does not have two distinct
natures. When I say that Christ is a divine human, I mean simply that he has
the property of being human, and also the property of being divine. I do not
mean that he has a single property which is somehow a compromise between
these two properties. I think that Christ is a 'hybrid' of man and God not in
the sense that there is some hybrid nature which he instantiates but in the
sense, simply, that he possesses the property of being human and also the
property of being divine.
II

When we say that x partakes of human nature, we do not want to say that
x is human in every possible world in which it exists. However, we do want
to say that normally x will remain human in any possible world that might
be described as probable. We want to say something like this: if x changed
into something not human then, probably, x would no longer exist. These
considerations suggest the following definition of a 'nature.'
Let H be a property such that it makes sense to talk of a substance x having
that property at a time t. In particular, H is not to have the form 'being-P-attime-t.' For example, H is not to be a property like 'being human in 1989.'
For it would be redundant to talk of someone having that property in, say,
1990. 'Being human in 1989' is what one might call a timelessly possessed
property. These I wish to rule out.
Suppose, moreover, that it is not highly improbable that an existing object
have the property of being H, and not highly improbable that an existing
object have the property of not being H. (I do not think that non-existent
objects can have properties but I include the word 'existing' in case the reader
does.) For example, H is not to be a property like 'eXisting' or 'never having
been blown up by an atomic bomb.' As another example, H is not to be the
property of 'not having suffered an accident which normally causes the annihilation of its victims.' For it is highly improbable that an existing object
have the property of not being H.
Given these constraints, we say that
H is a nature
if and only if
for every thing x (allowing, however, one or two exceptions), if x has H just
before a time t then the conditional probability of
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x continues to exist after t
on
x ceases at t to have H (but does not cease to have any other property
whose loss is not entailed by the loss of H)
is very low (i.e., is 0 or only very slightly greater than 0).
For example, 'canine' is a nature because it is highly improbable that any
dog survive the loss of this property. On the other hand, 'being a French
speaker' is not a nature because it is highly probable that a French speaker
survive the loss of his ability to speak French. Forgetting a language does not
cause annihilation.
The above definition is long, and so I offer what I take to be an equivalent
but shorter version:
H is a nature
if and only if
it is highly improbable that something still exist if it is no longer H.

Note that in the shorter version, the improbability is compatible with there
being one or two entities that will very probably survive the loss of a nature
H. One or two exceptions will not distort the probability distribution. This
point is important because 'human' is a nature, and I want to say that, whether
or not he ceases to be human, the Word of God will certainly continue to
exist.
At this point the reader may wonder why I need to bring in probability. If
I am going to make an exception for the Word of God, why do I not just give
some very simple definition of a 'nature'? For if it turns out that Christ's
being human leads to some awkward consequence on this definition, I need
only say that Christ is an exception.
To this I reply that I wish to give not just any facile definition of 'nature'
but one that has some logical weight. And I believe that 'natures' really are
tied to probabilities. Second, an exception is quite a natural thing to have if
you are dealing with probabilities. If you do not have a probabilistic situation,
however, an exception will seem ad hoc. Third, in section VI, I wish to talk
about the 'spiritual nature' of the saints, and I cannot plausibly make stark
exceptions for all of them.
Note that the definition does not apply to timelessly possessed properties
like 'being an even number.' We do not say that 16 is even at three o'clock.
For our purposes, this does not matter. By means of suitable complications,
we could extend the definition to cover the case of mathematical properties
and any other timelessly possessed properties. 5 However, this extrapolation
would not help us in the defence of the logical coherence of the four theological claims. As far as God is concerned, whether he exists timelessly or
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not, we shall assume that he relates to time in such a way that it makes sense
to say things like
God is at all times omnipotent
or
God will still be omnipotent tomorrow morning.
We shall also assume that if it makes sense in the first place to say that God
is human then it also makes sense to say that
God did not have a human nature in 20 Be but he did have a human nature
in 20 AD.
There are no doubt other ways than mine of defining a 'nature.' For example,
one might wish to be more 'scientific' and relate 'natures' more closely to
the latest theories of matter. In any case, the definition I have offered can be
recommended for the following four reasons: (1) it captures the idea that a
nature is a kind of constant in the midst of change; (2) it does not sanction
the inference of the conclusion 'x has to be H' from the premiss 'x has nature
H'; (3) it enables us to defend the logical coherence of the four theological
claims against certain objections; and (4) it accords with many of our preanalytic intuitions about natures. In the next section we shall tackle the
theology. In this section we give some examples to show that our definition
does indeed function in a 'reasonable' manner.
1.
H = being a human-being.
It is most improbable that Socrates (or
any other ordinary human) change into something non-human without ceasing to exist. Thus being a human is a nature.
Note that on a Pythagorean view, it often happens that the same entity is
first a man, then a fish, then a bean, and then a man again. This, precisely,
is a view which I take to be as highly improbable as the alleged events
themselves. Indeed, I think it logically incoherent that a person become a
bean without ceasing to exist.
2.
H = being a non-human.
'Being a human' is a nature because it
marks human beings off from the rest of reality in a way that is very important
to their identity. There is, as it were, a dangerously high wall between the
human and the non-human, and any human being crossing over it puts his
very existence at risk. The same wall, it seems, would prevent a non-human
entity from easily acquiring human nature. Indeed, the definition does imply
that 'being a non-human' is also a nature.
Against this view, one might raise the following point. Let x be some
biological material capable of joining together to form a human being. Since
it is not improbable that x survive the change from being a non-human to
being a human, the definition implies that being non-human is not a nature.
To this I reply that a human being is not a human body, and a human body
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is not the biological material of which it was made. Thus being a non-human
really is a nature.
3.
H = being brown.
This is not a nature according to the definition
because an object picked at random may very weH survive the change from
being brown to being non-brown.
4.
H = being an introvert. If we assume that being an introvert is a
fixed psychological disposition much more basic to a person's identity than,
say, his racial characteristics, then it does foHow that this is a nature, and it
is literally true that some people are introverts 'by nature.' However, if it is
logically possible that, say, Martians regularly fluctuate between being introverted and being extraverted, then H is not a nature. However, Martians or
not, we can at least say that the property of being a human introvert is most
likely a nature.
S.
H = being a sexy human.
A sexy human being will normally cease
to be sexy with old age. Thus, on the definition, being a sexy human is not
a nature.
If a divine being (Le. Yahweh) somehow ceased
6.
H = being divine.
to be divine then he would also cease to exist. It just could not be true that
some non-divine being used to be God but is now a mere creature. Hence
being divine is a nature.
If a submarine is graduaHy transformed
7.
H = being a submarine.
into a truck, does the original vehicle cease to exist? Should the owner say,
'I used to have a submarine but now I have a truck'? Should he say, 'my
submarine is now a truck'? I am not sure. Whether 'being a submarine' is a
nature or not is a moot point and, happily, this is reflected in the definition.
Neither by an appeal to common sense, nor by an appeal to the definition,
can we decide whether 'being a submarine' is a nature.
We may conclude from the above examples that in many cases our definition of a nature fits with our pre-analytic notion of a nature.
III

In this section we consider the first of the four theological claims, namely,
the claim that
It is possible for a substance to have two natures: human and divine.
Being human and being divine are both natures in our sense. Moreover, there
is nothing to prevent an object from having two natures: Socrates has the
nature of a human being and also the nature of a living being. The question
is therefore simply whether, at one and the same time, the same individual
can be both human and divine. Since this question is not directly related to
the topic of natures, we shall just offer one or two comments on it.
If one supposes that all human beings exist contingently, or that no divine
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being has a body, then nothing is at the same time both human and divine.
However, it is not necessary to make these suppositions: no dictionary gives
'contingent' as one of the defining properties of 'human,' and many religions
hold that a God can have a body. If we take seriously the fact that God made
man in his own image, we should not balk at the idea that one can give
reasonable definitions of 'human' and 'divine' in such a way that these two
properties are compatible. For example, one might define a divine being as
a noncontingent person who has the power knowingly to create or destroy
any contingent object, and one might define a human being as a rational
life-form with such-and-such a basic appearance. Assuming that it is logically
possible that there be a divine being in the above sense, it does not seem
impossible that he be able to interact with a human mind and body in such a
way as to be himself human.
There are, of course, some difficulties. Does a person who is both divine
and human think like God or like a human being? For example, is he able to
solve mathematical problems far beyond the limits of human intelligence?
One answer to this question is that God can somehow limit his intelligence
for awhile. Another answer is that there is no limit on human intelligence. A
third answer is that the divine human has two minds: his divine mind knows
all about his human mind but his human mind has only limited access to his
divine mind. (Here one thinks of psychoanalytic studies done on persons with
more than one stream of consciousness.) A fourth answer to the question is
that a divine human should always be seen either 'as divine' or 'as human.'
Every assertion about such a person should be interpreted to include a qualifier of the form 'in his divine nature' or 'in his human nature.' For example,
the assertion
Jesus could solve advanced calculus problems

should be interpreted to mean either
Jesus, in his human nature, could solve advanced calculus problems

or
Jesus, in his divine nature, could solve advanced calculus problems.

On the first interpretation, the assertion is false, since an ordinary man living
in first century Palestine could not solve advanced calculus problems. On the
second interpretation, however, the assertion is true, since the Word of God
is omniscient.
There are also problems with the body of a divine human. Can a divine
human run at the rate of 1000 kilometers an hour? Can he build a house in
5 seconds? Perhaps we should say that, in his divine nature, Jesus could have
built a house in 5 seconds. But then it sounds odd to talk about Jesus doing
a purely human activity 'in his divine nature.'
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Another difficulty is that it somehow sounds wrong to say that God is a
human being. Does this 'wrongness' indicate that there really is an underlying
logical incoherence? Here, I think not. Here, I think it is just a matter of
linguistic convention. Christians, at any rate, seem to understand the word
'God' differently, depending on whether it is a subject or a predicate. When
Christians use 'God' as the subject of a sentence, they think of that word as
referring to the invisible Trinity, and they therefore do not want to follow
that subject with any predicate which somehow clashes with that notion.
However, when they use the word 'God' in a predicate, they are sometimes
thinking of God only in the vague sense of a divine being. For example,
Christians say that the Holy Spirit is God but they do not say that God is the
Holy Spirit. For in the subject position 'God' means 'the invisible Trinity'
and it is not true (on the Christian view) that the whole Trinity is the Holy
Spirit. I claim, then, that the only reason that it sounds wrong to say that God
is a human being is that this may be understood to mean that the invisible
Trinity is a human being. Compare the statements
God clung to Mary's neck

and
Mary held God in her arms.

The first might well sound a little awkward to a Christian but not so much
the second. The awkwardness in the first case is not, however, due to anything
unsound in the doctrine of the Incarnation but rather to the fact that we tend
to interpret the first statement in the following rather oxymoronic fashion:
The invisible Trinity clung to Mary's neck.

For more on the commensurability of the divine and human natures, the reader
may wish to consult T. V. Morris's The Logic a/God Incarnate and the fourth
volume of Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles. 6
IV

The second theological claim is that
The Word has the divine nature essentially but human nature accidentally.

The traditional Christian teaching is that God's becoming human was a free
and supererogatory deed. In some possible worlds, therefore, God is not a
human being. Although God is and has to be divine, he is not necessarily
human, and thus, in this sense, we may say that he has human nature 'accidentally. '
Since being non-human is a nature, we may deduce from our definition that
the Incarnation is an improbable event. We live in a strange and wonderful
possible world. Like the tomato plant-rosebush, Jesus of Nazareth is a most

Faith and Philosophy

234

unusual object. Of course, this is merely part of what we mean when we say
that Christmas is a miracle. In a more 'normal' possible world, God leaves
humanity to suffer the natural consequences of sin. In the actual universe,
however, God intervenes, giving us mercy we do not deserve, mercy which
upsets the normal pattern of justice. What God has done is amazingly generous. It is for this reason that he deserves special thanks and praise for coming
to save us. 7

v
The third claim is that
It is not possible for a non-divine human to acquire the divine nature.

One might think that this claim is inconsistent with the previous claim that
something can, at the same time, be both human and divine. In this section,
we explain how the two claims are not inconsistent.
A number of mystics, including the author of the Second Letter of Peter,
suggest that an ordinary human being could become divine. s If we take the
above definition of 'di vine,' however, it follows that no contingent being can
become God. For according to the above definition, every divine being is
noncontingent. Thus if x exists and is divine then x exists in all possible
worlds. Hence it is not the case that in some possible worlds x exists whereas
in other possible worlds x does not exist. Hence x is at no time contingent.
If, then, non-divine humans are contingent, they cannot acquire the divine
nature. Scripture verses about our 'sharing the divine nature' are thus best
interpreted to mean that we shall become, not divine, but much more like
God. We discuss this possibility in section VI.
There are, no doubt, other definitions of 'human' and 'divine' according
to which the transition from merely human to divine is possible. What makes
my definitions interesting, precisely, is that, while allowing incarnations of
gods, they exclude apotheoses of mere humans. With my definitions we have
the traditional Christian view that, although the Word became flesh, there
will always be an unbridgeable gap between ordinary humans and the divine
human called 'Jesus.' The finite is nothing in comparison with the infinite.
VI

The fourth theological claim is that
Non-divine humans who become Christians are given the higher nature of
the 'spiritual man'.

As Paul writes in the fourth chapter of the Letter to the Ephesians:
You must be made new ill mind and spirit, and put on the new nature of God's
creating, which shows itself in the just and devout life called for by the truth.
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One could take this as being purely metaphorical but for Paul it has some
important consequences which suggest that he took it literally. For one thing,
the new spiritual person is free from the old law: he or she is bound only by
a new and higher code of conduct. Paul even goes so far as to tell Titus that
To the pure all things are pure. 9

For another thing, it is quite in line with Paul's thinking to hold that Christians
are an improbable hybrid. When they get to heaven, they will still be human
but they will also be extremely different from the way they are now. 10 Because of this, it may not be such a bad exegesis to take Paul as really meaning
that Christians acquire a new nature. The improbable event of the Incarnation
results in the improbable event of a saint becoming more than merely human.
What is this new nature like? Its main features, I would say, are an increased capacity for knowledge and love. The soul is 'illuminated.' Thus it
is that 'the spiritual person can assess the value of everything.'11 Moreover,
on account of this enriched ability to know and to love, the spiritual person
can more easily take a God's eye view of ethical situations and judge them
in a way that, in some cases, permits an action at variance with the dictates
of natural law ethics for ordinary human beings. Thus 'to the pure all things
are pure.'
It does seem paradoxical that the same individual could both be subject to
the morality of, say, natural law for humans, and also transcend that morality
in Christ. Such paradoxes are the meat of good books on the Christian faith.
Moreover, paradox is not contradiction, and no one has conclusively demonstrated that Abraham acted immorally when, in obedience to a higher law, he
set out to kill his innocent son Isaac.
Because natures are not essences, there are possible worlds in which Saint
Peter remained a sinner. Nonetheless, in the actual universe, his new spiritual
life became the characteristic mark of the man, the meaning if not the definition of his life. Conversely, in the case of apostasy, we not unnaturally say
that the ex -Christian has lost his identity, that he has become a different
person. This is not literally true but there is truth enough in it to suggest that
what he has lost is properly called his Christian nature. 12
Magill University

NOTES
1. Romans 8:1-17; Ephesians 4:22-24.
2. I assume that the Word (the Second Person of the Trinity) exists in every possible
world.
3. Nichomachean Ethics 1152a30 and Rhetoric 1369bl-2.
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Possibility," Mind, 81 (1972),481-94.

5. We might say that all mathematical properties (e.g. being even) were natures. We
might say that 'being a seraph' was a nature because if an angel were in time it probably
would not survive the change from being a seraph to being a non-seraph.
6. The Logic a/God Incarnate was published in Ithaca in 1986 by the Cornell University
Press.
7. Note that Jesus still is human (with a body) and will always be human.
8.2 Peter 1:4.
9. Titus 1:15. For more of the same, see Romans 8:1-13; 1 Corinthians 2:14-16; 6:7; 2
Corinthians 5: 17; Ephesians 4:22-24; Colossians 3:9-11.
10. 1 Corinthians 15:35-57.
11. 1 Corinthians 2: 15.
12. I wish to thank Eleonore Stump, the editor and the referees for many useful
comments.

